Now You See It, Now You Don't:

Controlling for Contingencies and Stimulus Repetitions Eliminates the Gratton Effect
Learning processes mould behaviour via knowledge about the contingency between (Lewicki, 1985 (Lewicki, , 1986 Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & Besner, 2007; Schmidt & Besner, 2008; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Besner, 2010) or sequence of (Hommel, 1998; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) events we encounter in our environment. The role of cognitive control processes on our performance and behaviour has also been intensely studied in cognitive psychology (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Cohen & Hudson, 1994; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Rabbitt, 1966) . Often debate can be quite heated as to whether a given result reported in the literature is due to learning processes, cognitive control processes, or some combination of the two (e.g., see Blais & Bunge, 2010; Schmidt, 2010) . One such result is the Gratton effect. Initially proposed as a cognitive control effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) , several researchers have challenged this view (e.g., Mayr & Awh, 2009; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003) . This paper will present what we feel to be clear evidence that the Gratton effect results from non-conflict task biases (primarily contingency and stimulus repetition biases).
Stimulus Conflict and Cognitive Control
Several paradigms exist for studying stimulus conflict. One of these is the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991 , for a review), in which participants typically respond slower and less accurately to the print colour of a colour word if the word and colour are incongruent (e.g., the word GREEN printed in blue; GREEN blue ) rather than congruent (e.g., BLUE blue ).
Similar congruency effects are observed in the Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967) , where an irrelevant distracting location (e.g., left) interferes with a localized response (e.g., a right key press). Yet another paradigm is the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) , where irrelevant flanking letters interfere with responding to a target letter (e.g., a distracting "b" to the left and the right of a target "c"). Work with paradigms such as these demonstrates that unintentional processing of distracting information has an important impact on performance in the intended task.
While the impact of unintentional processes on behaviour in stimulus conflict tasks is unequivocal, many researchers are interested in the role of controlled behaviour on moderating performance in these tasks. One effect studied in this regard is the Gratton effect. The Gratton effect is the finding that congruency effects are larger following congruent relative to incongruent trials. This effect was first observed in the Eriksen flanker task by Gratton and colleagues (1992) , but has also been observed in other tasks such as the Stroop task (e.g., Mayr & Awh, 2009; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006) . The standard account of the Gratton effect, termed the conflict adaptation account, is that participants detect conflict on incongruent trials and decrease attention to the word on the following trial in order to avoid further conflict. As a result, the Stroop effect will be smaller. In contrast, on congruent trials there is no conflict, so attention will not be as constrained on the following trial. Hence, the word can interfere more strongly and the Stroop effect will be larger. Due to these processes, a Gratton effect will emerge, that is, an interaction between congruency on the current trial and congruency on the previous trial (n -1 congruency). As will be discussed in the following section, although by far the most popular account of the Gratton effect, the conflict adaptation account has not gone unchallenged.
Stimulus Binding Biases
There are a whole series of confounds present in standard Stroop paradigms that can lead toward an interaction between congruency and n -1 congruency in the absence of conflict adaptation. Essentially all of these confounds bias the interaction in the same direction, that is, in the direction of a Gratton effect. Several of them have already been studied. The first one is related to stimulus binding effects. Hommel (1998) observed that participants respond more quickly to trials in which both the distracting and target stimulus dimensions alternate (e.g., BLUE red followed by GREEN yellow ; BLUE red → GREEN yellow ) or both repeat (e.g., BLUE red → BLUE red ) relative to when one, but not both of the stimulus dimensions repeat (e.g., BLUE red → BLUE yellow or BLUE red → GREEN red ). The claimed reason for the impairment of performance on these partial repetition trials is that repetition of one stimulus dimension (e.g., the word) leads to retrieval of the previous binding (e.g., BLUE red ), which conflicts with the processing of the current stimulus (e.g., BLUE yellow ). Mayr and colleagues (2003) pointed out that stimulus repetitions, alternations, and partial repetitions are not equally prevalent in the four crucial conditions used for assessing the Gratton effect. They found that after analysing alternation trials only (i.e., trials in which both the word and colour change), the Gratton effect disappeared. Subsequently, however, other work has demonstrated that Gratton effects, though weakened, can be observed even after word-word and colour-colour repetitions are removed (Freitas, Bahar, Yang, & Bahar, 2007; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonnald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004; Notebaert et al., 2006) . Further work has also removed word-colour repetitions (i.e., negative priming trials; e.g., BLUE red → GREEN blue ) and colour-word repetitions (BLUE red → RED yellow ), with results again showing a reduction but not elimination of the Gratton effect (Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007; Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006) .
Sequential Contingency Biases
Contingency biases (Schmidt, in press ) are a second confound that have been shown to artificially elevate the size of the Gratton effect. Experimenters often present distracting colour words more often in their congruent colour than would be expected by chance. For instance, in a four-choice task BLUE might be presented in blue 50% of the time, where chance would be 25%. This is problematic because Schmidt and colleagues (2007) have shown that participants learn these contingencies and respond faster and more accurately to high contingency trials (i.e., where the word is presented in its most frequent colour) relative to low contingency trials (i.e., where the word is presented in an unexpected colour). If words are presented most often in their congruent colours, then congruency and contingency are perfectly confounded: congruent trials are high contingency and incongruent trials are low contingency. This is also true on the preceding (n -1) trial: n -1 congruent trials are high contingency and n -1 incongruent trials are low contingency. Schmidt and colleagues have further shown that contingency and n -1 contingency (i.e., contingency on the previous trial) interact. Specifically, the contingency effect (low contingency -high contingency) is larger following high contingency trials than following low contingency trials. Thus, Gratton experiments with contingency confounds will be biased by a sequential contingency effect.
There are several possible reasons why a sequential contingency effect might occur. One account, superficially similar to the conflict adaptation account, is that participants increase attention to the word following a correct response prediction. The word correctly predicts the response on high contingency trails (e.g., for BLUE blue , where BLUE is presented most often in blue), thus leading to more attention to the word on the following trial, making for a larger contingency effect. In contrast, the word does not correctly predict the response on low contingency trials (e.g., for BLUE red ), thus leading to less attention to the word on the following trial, making for a smaller contingency effect. Note that the attentional modulation component of this account is only superficially similar to the conflict adaptation account, as the system is proposed to shift attention based on response expectancy and not based on conflict (i.e., congruency).
Another, non-attentional explanation for the sequential contingency effect could be stimulus sequence biases. Participants respond faster to predictable sequences of trials (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) and participants will see a sequence of any two given high contingency trials more frequently than a series of any two given low contingency trials. For instance, because the high contingency trials BLUE blue and GREEN green are presented quite frequently, participants will very often see the sequence BLUE blue → GREEN green . In contrast, they will much less frequently see a sequence such as BLUE red → GREEN green or GREEN green → BLUE red , given that the stimulus MOVE red appears only infrequently. Indeed, such sequences violate the expectation of the stimuli likely to follow or precede a given high contingency trial (i.e., GREEN green is not expected to go with BLUE red ). Thus, (high contingency) congruent trials will be faster if preceded by a (high contingency) congruent trial rather than a (low contingency) incongruent trial.
Similarly, a (low contingency) incongruent trial will be impaired if preceded by a (high contingency) congruent trial relative to a (low contingency) incongruent trial. 1 Regardless of what the mechanism is driving the sequential contingency effect, it has been demonstrated by Schmidt and colleagues (2007) . Thus, the smaller Stroop effect following (low contingency) incongruent trials relative to (high contingency) congruent trials may be in part a result of a sequential contingency effect rather than a sequential congruency effect.
Further support for the idea that contingency biases contribute to the Gratton effect comes from a study by Mayr and Awh (2009) who varied the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials from 70% to 30% in a six-choice task. Reducing the proportion of congruent trials reduces contingency biases and this manipulation reduced the Gratton effect. However, it did not explain the whole effect: a (reduced) Gratton effect was still present, even after deleting stimulus repetitions in the 30% condition. We do note, however, that 30% congruent items in a six-choice task is still well above chance (16.7%), thus not eliminating all contingency biases. Some studies do present congruent trials no more often than expected by chance, particularly in two-choice tasks (e.g., Davelaar & Stevens, 2009) . However, these studies do not control for stimulus bindings (and cannot do so with a two-choice task). Nieuwenhuis and colleagues (2006) were able to control for response repetitions, however, and this eliminated the Gratton effect in their contingency-unbiased two-choice experiments. Although they were unable to control for partial stimulus repetitions due to the two-choice nature of the tasks, their results are encouraging for the idea that the Gratton effect is due to sequential confounds rather than conflict adaptation.
The Binding Account
We use the term binding account to refer to the idea that the Gratton effect is actually due to sequential confounds such as binding effects and contingencies. It has already been demonstrated that both stimulus bindings and contingencies can independently inflate the size of the Gratton effect. Thus, for instance, if one controls for stimulus repetitions, but uses a high proportion of congruent trials, then one cannot know whether the remaining effect is due to conflict adaptation or to contingency biases. In this paper, we report two experiments in which multiple sequential confounds were controlled for simultaneously.
An overview of the literature suggests that most Gratton experiments are confounded by either stimulus binding effects (e.g., Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007 Davelaar & Stevens, 2009; Egner, Delano, & Hirsch, 2007; Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 2010b; Kerns et al., 2004; Notebaert et al., 2006; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005, Experiment 1; Wendt, Kluwe, & Peters, 2006) or contingency biases (e.g., Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007; Mayr & Awh, 2009; Ullsperger et al., 2005, Experiment 2; Verbruggen et al., 2006) . Contingency biases are less common in the (typically two-choice) flanker tasks, but stimulus binding effects are much more difficult to control for in these two-choice flanker tasks, for reasons we will discuss later.
Stimulus binding trims are often completed in Stroop and Simon experiments but are often incomplete (e.g., Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007 , controlled for stimulus and response repetitions in their Simon experiments, but not for stimulus location to response location repetitions, or vice versa).
Only one study that we are aware of has effectively controlled for binding effects and contingencies. In experiments reported by Freitas and colleagues (2007) participants performed two two-choice tasks (e.g., a colour-word Stroop and arrow flanker Stroop) that could randomly alternate from trial to trial. Thus, congruency could be manipulated from one trial to the next without repeating any stimuli. There were also no contingency biases. Freitas and colleagues did observe Gratton effects under these conditions. However, this finding is inconsistent with other similar reports showing that the Gratton effect is completely eliminated when the task (or type of interference; i.e., colour-word Stroop or arrow flanker Stroop) on the current trial is different from the task on the previous trial (e.g., Egner et al., 2007; Funes et al., 2010a Funes et al., , 2010b Wendt et al., 2006) . For instance, Wendt and colleagues found that flanker congruency on one trial did not modulate the Simon effect on the following trial and, similarly, that Simon congruency on one trial did not modulate the flanker congruency effect on the following trial. Furthermore, there are some caveats with the task switching approach of Frietas and colleagues. The critical conditions they used not only varied whether the previous trial was congruent or incongruent, but also included a task switch. It could be the case that a task switch is easier following a congruent trial relative to an incongruent trial, leading to quicker task reconfiguration and a larger Stroop effect after congruent relative to incongruent trials (i.e., a Gratton effect). This is not quite the same as the conflict adaptation idea that the conflict itself causes a reduction of attention to the word. A related caveat will be noted below when we introduce the concept of congruency task switches.
In our experiments, we adopted a different approach than that of Freitas and colleagues (2007) . In order to completely control for both contingency and stimulus binding confounds, two conditions must be met. Condition 1 is that all stimulus words must be presented equally often in all colours. This approach eliminates any impact of contingency biases. Condition 2 is that all responses on trials with word-word, colour-colour, word-colour, and colour-word repetitions must be removed from the analysis. In this way, stimulus binding effects can no longer produce a Gratton effect. In order to meet this condition, the task must be four-choice or greater. In twoand three-choice Stroop tasks it is impossible to delete all types of stimulus repetitions. For instance, in a three-choice task it is impossible to have an incongruent trial followed by an incongruent trial without repeating one of the stimulus dimensions. For instance, if BLUE red is presented on trial n -1, then to make another incongruent trial on trial n one can use the third colour (e.g., green) as either the colour or the word, but blue or red must be used as the other stimulus dimension (because there are only three colours in a three-choice task).
In the first of our two experiments, each of four colour words was presented equally often in each of four colours, thus preventing unwanted contingency learning biases (Condition 1).
Because the task is four-choice, it is possible to get observations for all four congruency by n -1 congruency conditions from trials without word-word, colour-colour, word-colour, or colourword stimulus repetitions (Condition 2). As illustrated in Table 1 , the manipulation produces 15 different trial types. The first goal of the experiment is to assess Gratton effects before and after removing repetition trials. For this, Trial Types 1, 3, 6, and 9 can be used to assess Gratton effects independent of any sequential confounds (see Table 1 ).
( Table 1 about here)
Congruency Switch Costs
In our experiments, we consider for the first time a third possible source of confounding that could also contribute to the appearance of a Gratton effect. This third source involves congruency switch costs and will be referred to as the switch hypothesis. The switch hypothesis posits that the processing and memory encoding of incongruent and congruent trials procedes somewhat differently. On incongruent trials (e.g., GREEN blue ), two response codes are generated, one by the word (green key) and one by the colour (blue key). Thus, the cognitive system must distinguish between two potential responses and bind one potential response to the word and the other to the colour. In contrast, on congruent trials (e.g., BLUE blue ) one response code is generated by both the word and the colour (blue key). Thus, the cognitive system does not need to distinguish between two potential responses and the single potential response is bound to both the colour and the word. In addition, the timing with which stimulus information is available to the cognitive system is different, due to the conflict occurring on incongruent, but not congruent trials. Our proposal is that the procedures that the cognitive system must engage in while processing stimuli and binding information into trial memories are slightly different on congruent and incongruent trials, thus requiring some reconfiguration on congruency switches (i.e., incongruent trials followed by congruent trials and congruent trials followed by incongruent trials) relative to trials where congruency stays the same (i.e., congruent trials followed by congruent trials and incongruent trials followed by incongruent trials). This recalibration, we propose, may sometimes come at a cost, analogous to the performance decrements observed when a task switch occurs (Jersild, 1927; see Monsell, 2003 , for a review). Note that this is very different from detecting conflict and adapting attention (i.e., as per the conflict adaptation account).
Congruency switch costs could affect the results in several possible ways. Experiencing a congruency switch could slow processing (leading to a Gratton effect in response times) and/or it could increase errors (leading to a Gratton effect in error rates). Either way, the Stroop effect would be larger on trials following a congruent trial, because there would be a switch cost impairing incongruent trials, thus increasing the difference between congruent and incongruent trials. In contrast, the Stroop effect would be smaller on trials following incongruent trials, because there would be a switch cost impairing congruent trials, thus decreasing the difference between congruent and incongruent trials.
2 Thus, congruency switch costs will produce a Gratton effect.
Our primary research goal, however, is to assess the validity of the conflict adaptation account of Gratton effects. Therefore, rather than trying to demonstrate the existence of congruency switch effects, our main aim is to determine whether any Gratton effects that remain after trimming stimulus repetitions are due to congruency switch costs or to true conflict adaptation. The conflict adaptation account claims that the change in the size of the contingency effect is due to changes in attention to the word. Given that the Stroop effect is almost exclusively an interference phenomenon (e.g., see MacLeod, 1991, for a review), one should therefore expect that all (or at least most) of the change in the size of the Stroop effect should occur in the incongruent condition. Congruent trials should be largely unaffected due to the fact that fact facilitation for congruent trials is, at best, very minimal.
In contrast, the switch hypothesis proposes performance costs for incongruent trials preceded by congruent trials and (more importantly) congruent trials preceded by incongruent trials. Thus, congruent trials should be affected according to the switch hypothesis. Furthermore, analysing congruency as a function of switch rather than n -1 congruency should lead to roughly additive effects of congruency and switch (for a similar argument in the proportion congruency literature regarding contingency and congruency, see Schmidt & Besner, 2008) . Specifically, congruent trials preceded by an incongruent trial (switch) should be impaired relative to congruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (repetition) and incongruent trials preceded by a congruent trial (switch) should be impaired relative to incongruent trials preceded by an incongruent trial (repetition). That is, there should be slower reaction times and/or a larger number of errors for both congruent and incongruent trials in the switch condition, thus not changing the difference between these two conditions and making this difference roughly the same size as in the repetition condition. A visual inspection of the results of Freitas and colleagues (2007) , where a Gratton effect was observed after controlling for contingency and binding biases, seems consistent with this pattern. Note that such a pattern is not consistent with the conflict adaptation account, because congruent trials should not be affected as much as incongruent trials by a change in attention to words.
Additionally, if a Gratton effect is observed in errors after the stimulus repetition trims, then an analysis of the type of errors participants make can help us distinguish between conflict adaptation and congruency switch costs. According to the conflict adaptation account more attention is given to the word following a congruent relative to an incongruent trial. This should mean that participants are more prone to produce word reading errors, where the participant produces the response associated with the word rather than the response associated with the colour (e.g., pressing the green key to the stimulus GREEN blue ). 3 The second type of errors are random errors, that is, where participants press a key at random (often a response other than the correct response or the response associated with the word). Such errors suggest that the participant is simply not attending to the task or is stuck coming up with a response and randomly presses one of the available response buttons. Increased attention to the word should only produce more word reading errors and not more random errors. In contrast, the switch hypothesis does not predict an increase in word reading errors after congruent relative to incongruent trials, but rather predicts an increase in random errors on switch trials when the system is stuck because of a congruency switch.
Experiment 1 Method
Participants. Twenty-three Ghent University undergraduates participated in exchange for course credit.
Apparatus. Participants made their responses with an AZERTY keyboard by pressing the "D" key for blue, the "F" key for green, the "J" key for yellow, and the "K" key for red. Stimulus and response timing were controlled by E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2002 Procedure. Participants sat approximately 60 cm from the screen. On each trial, they were presented with a white "+" as a fixation for 100 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms, followed by the stimulus for 1500 ms or until a response was made. This was followed by 400 ms of blank screen for correct responses or 400 ms of "XXX" in red for incorrect responses and trials where participants failed to respond.
Results
Mean correct response latencies and error percentages were collected for each participant.
The means for each of the 15 unique repetition trial types are presented in Table 1 . Gratton effects were first analysed without removing stimulus repetitions and then with colour-colour, word-word, word-colour, and colour-word repetitions removed (Types 1, 3, 6, and 9 in Table 1 ).
The data of non-repetition trials were also analysed for block effects. Finally, the error data were analysed for switch effects. Trials in which participants failed to respond were excluded from all analyses.
Response latencies with repetitions included. We first examined the response latencies with repetition trials included in the analysis. These data are presented in the left panel of Figure ( Table 3 about A relatively large Gratton effect did remain in the error data after removing stimulus repetitions. Without further analysis, this effect would be consistent with the conflict adaptation account. However, further analyses demonstrated that this remaining effect was due to congruency switch costs and not conflict adaptation. Specifically, word reading errors were not more likely following a congruent than an incongruent trial, in contrast to the prediction of increased errors by the conflict adaptation account. Instead, the error Gratton effect was due to a greater number of random key press errors following a congruency switch (i.e., a congruent trial followed by an incongruent trial or an incongruent trial followed by a congruent trial). The conflict adaptation account was therefore unable to explain any of the data in Experiment 1.
These results instead provide tentative support for the idea that congruency switch costs can contribute to the Gratton effect. No switch costs were found for response times.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conceptually identical to Experiment 1, but was a flanker task rather than a colour-word Stroop task. In the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) , a centrally-located target letter is presented with distracting letters flanking it to the left and right (e.g., FFJFF, where "J" is the target and the "F"s are distracters). The flankers match the target on congruent trials (e.g., JJJJJ) and mismatch on incongruent trials (e.g., FFJFF). Similar to a colour-word Stroop task, participants respond to the identity of the target with a key press. This experiment served as a replication of Experiment 1.
Method Participants
Twenty-four Ghent University undergraduates participated in exchange for course credit.
Apparatus
The apparatus for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1, except participants pressed the "D" key for D, the "F" key for F, the "J" key for J, and the "K" key for K.
Design and Procedure
The design and procedure of Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1 with a few exceptions. Stimuli were strings of five capital letters presented in white, which consisted of one centrally-located target letter (D, F, J, or K) and a distracting letter (D, F, J, or K) presented twice to the left and the right of the target (e.g., KKFKK), for a total of 16 unique stimuli. Each target letter was presented equally often with each distracter letter.
Results
The means for each of the 15 unique repetition trial types are presented in Table 4 . Gratton effects were first assessed without removing trials with repetitions and second with target-target, flanker-flanker, flanker-target, and target-flanker repetitions removed (Types 1, 3, 6, and 9 in Table 4 ). The data of non-repetition trials were also analysed for block effects. Trials in which participants failed to respond were excluded from all analyses.
( Table 4 about .01. Indeed, the interaction was numerically in the incorrect direction for a Gratton effect.
( Table 5 about  < .002. Again, the effect was numerically in the incorrect direction for a Gratton effect.
( Table 6 about here)
Discussion
Similar to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 replicated the basic Gratton effect in response times. However, by using stimuli that were not contingency biased and removing trials containing stimulus repetitions the Gratton effect was again eliminated, even in the first block. These results again support the binding account by showing that the Gratton effect is fully explained by stimulus binding and contingency confounds and again produced no evidence for conflict adaptation. In contrast to Experiment 1, no Gratton effect in errors was observed in Experiment 2, even in the untrimmed data. Thus, there was no point in conducting switch analyses on these data. These data were therefore also unable to provide us another test of the switch hypothesis.
Most critically, however, Experiment 2 again failed to find any support for the conflict adaptation account of Gratton effects.
General Discussion
The results of two experiments provide strong support for an interpretation of the Gratton If the switch analysis were ignored, one may want to argue that observing an effect in errors but not response times is not a problem for the conflict adaptation account. Indeed, although response time effects are generally much more reliable than error effects, it is certainly possible to maximize effects in errors while decreasing effects in response times, for instance, by using a response deadline procedure (e.g., Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994) . However, there was a reliable and sufficiently large (84 ms) main effect of congruency in the response time data of Experiment 1 with repetitions excluded, demonstrating clearly that response time effects were present, but they were simply not modulated by n -1 congruency.
Thus, there was no trade-off between response time and error effects.
Alternatively, one could defend the conflict adaptation account by suggesting that there was a ceiling effect for incongruent trials in the response latency data, thus preventing an increased interference effect following congruent trials in response times. However, this seems both unusual and unlikely given that these trials were not responded to unusually slowly (indeed, faster than some similar reports; e.g., Mayr & Awh, 2009) . Further, the switch analysis was inconsistent with the conflict adaptation prediction that the error Gratton effect should be driven by increased word reading errors. From our perspective, the account that best fits the data is a hybrid of the binding account and the switch hypothesis. It must be noted, however, that support for our a priori switch hypothesis is currently limited only to the error data of one of our experiments. More work is of course necessary. Nevertheless, the data support the conclusion that the Gratton effect is merely the by-product of contingency, stimulus binding, and (possibly) congruency switch costs. This contrasts sharply with the conventional view, which touts the Gratton effect as a demonstration of cognitive control.
Conflict Monitoring
The results of this work bear strongly on the conflict monitoring literature. Botvinick and colleagues (2001) presented a computational model that both detects conflict (e.g., on an incongruent trial) and subsequently adapts to this conflict by adjusting attention. The two key pieces of evidence produced for supporting the conflict monitoring model of Botvinick and colleagues are the proportion congruent effect and the Gratton effect. However, Schmidt and Besner (2008; see also, Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2007) Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008) . Although this is still a very heated area of debate, this work suggests that the proportion congruent effect is driven by learned word-response relationships and not conflict adaptation. While the lead author has argued (often parenthetically) in these papers that Gratton effects, in contrast to proportion congruent effects, are probably due to conflict adaptation, the results of the present paper suggest otherwise. That is, the Gratton effect, too, is fully explained by confounds present in the task, and not by conflict adaptation. If this assertion is true, then this fact has serious implications for the conflict monitoring idea in general.
One purported strength of the conflict monitoring account is that it has been used to account for both behavioural and brain data (e.g., see the original conflict monitoring paper by Botvinick et al., 2001) . In particular, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) have been implicated in conflict monitoring and adaptation. It is important to highlight, however, that none of the key neuroimaging papers demonstrating a relationship between ACC and/or DLPFC activation and a behavioural effect properly control for all confounds. In particular, every one of these papers either introduces contingency confounds (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004) or fails to control for some or all stimulus binding effects (e.g., Blais & Bunge, 2010) .
ACC and DLPFC activation have been described as evidence for conflict adaptation.
However, it is equally conceivable that the ACC and DLPFC are responsible for memory consolidation or retrieval processes. Indeed, these areas have been implicated in this respect long before the conflict monitoring model was first proposed (e.g., see a review by Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997) . Further, our episodic memory account (Schmidt, 2010) assumes that short-term binding effects and long-term contingency learning effects are the result of the same memory storage and retrieval processes, so it stands to reason that both types of biases should be associated with activation in the same (or similar) regions (see, Nairne, 1996; Öztekin, McElree, Staresina, & Davachi, 2008 , for more on the single-store perspective on memory). The episodic account is also elegant and parsimonious in that various cognitive results (e.g., the proportion congruent effect and Gratton effect) are simply an incidental byproduct of memory storage and retrieval processes.
It is not unequivocally clear that one needs to make further assumptions about rapid cognitive control mechanisms such as the conflict monitoring and conflict adaptation processes suggested by authors such as Botvinick and colleagues (2001) .
If, however, in contrast to the current results, a Gratton effect can be demonstrated after all of the confounds highlighted in this paper have been controlled, then it is still necessary for these controls to be conducted in all future work with the Gratton effect. By failing to control for these confounds, one can never know whether a given result (e.g., the correlation between the behavioural effect and ACC/DLPFC activity) is due to conflict adaptation or to one or more of these confounds.
Conclusions
The results of the analyses presented in this paper suggest that the Gratton effect, contrary to popular belief, is not due to conflict adaptation. Instead, sequential task biases such as contingencies, stimulus bindings, and (possibly) congruency switch costs account for the critical interaction between congruency and n -1 congruency. The Gratton effect does not therefore seem to be an index of cognitive control. At a minimum, cognitive control processes certainly do not seem to account for very much variance in this paradigm. This work, along with related work from our lab (e.g., Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt & Besner, 2008) , has potentially devastating consequences for theory on conflict monitoring and conflict adaptation. Further research in this domain is certainly warranted. *W-W = word-word; C-C = colour-colour; W-C = word-colour; C-W = colour-word 
